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Abstract
This paper proposes an experimental test of the strategic equilib-
rium properties of the serial cost sharing rule originally proposed by
Shenker (1990) and then analyzed by Moulin and Shenker (1992). We
report measure of the performance and eﬃciency of the serial mecha-
nism by comparing the choices and payoﬀs attained by the subjects to
the expected ﬁrst best allocations. Experimental evidence shows that,
while some learning is needed, the serial mechanism leads to almost
eﬃcient allocations.
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11 Introduction
Many organizations face a continual challenge of allocating common resources
among its members. For instance, resources such as supercomputers, secre-
tarial support, observatories, lab facilities, university classrooms, etc., are
shared by many members within an organization. When the supply of the
shared good is not limited, the problem of its allocation reduces to search-
ing for a mechanism that allows sharing the cost of the service among the
users in a way that is just and fair. The constraints placed on the design
process can be numerous. For instance, incentive compatibility (i.e., truthful
preference reporting is a dominant strategy for each user); budget balancing;
anonymity (i.e., the name of the user does not matter); monotonicity (i.e.,
cost shares increase when users demand more output); and nonenvy (i.e., no
one would prefer the allocation of another agent). This amounts to identify-
ing a cost sharing mechanism which distributes the service and allocates the
cost among the users. The “serial cost sharing rule” is a possible mechanism
to allocate a shared resource among its users and share the corresponding
cost.
The serial cost sharing rule was originally proposed by Shenker (1990)
and then analyzed by Moulin and Shenker (1992) in the context of costs and
surplus sharing with complete information. The mechanism can be charac-
terized by four properties: unique Nash equilibrium at all preference proﬁles,
anonymity, monotonicity and smoothness (i.e., the individual cost shares are
continuously diﬀerentiable function of the output demand). When agents re-
questing quantities are endowed with convex, continuous and monotonic pref-
erences, then the game induced by the serial cost sharing rule is dominance-
solvable and the unique Nash equilibrium is robust to coalition deviations
provided that agents cannot transfer output (see Moulin and Shenker (1992)
and Deb and Razzolini (1999) for a proof). The applicability of the rule, how-
ever, still needs to be extensively veriﬁed. This motivates the study reported
in this paper.
We have constructed a series of experiments to evaluate the and perfor-
mance of the serial mechanism and its strategic equilibrium properties. We
studied the subjects’ reactions to realistic incentives in situations when a
common resource needs to be shared and paid for. The subjects were asked
to make decisions about the quantity of the common good they desire to
acquire, given that costs are shared according to the serial mechanism. This
2study reports measure of the performance and eﬃciency of the serial cost
sharing rule by comparing the choices and payoﬀs attained by the subjects
to the expected maximum possible values, under two diﬀerent treatments:
a sequential and a simultaneous-move treatment. The sequential treatment
corresponds to the implementation of the rule with successive elimination of
dominated strategies, while the simultaneous-move treatment corresponds to
the normal form of the game.
Few other experimental studies of the serial cost sharing rule are available
in the literature. One is by Y. Chen (2003). She studies the serial and the av-
erage cost sharing rules under complete and limited information. She found
that the two mechanisms are statistically indistinguishable under complete
information. However, under limited information the serial rule performs
better than the average cost pricing rule in terms both of equilibrium play
and system eﬃciency. Her testing of the serial cost sharing rule, however,
involves only two subjects at the time, and it is framed as a learning process.
T h et e s t i n go ft h er u l ew h e nm o r et h a nt w os u b j e c t sa r ei n v o l v e dr a i s e sc h a l -
lenging experimental design questions. A preliminary study by Chen and
Razzolini (2004) compare the two rules with twelve players of four diﬀerent
types under various information settings. The objective is to assess the per-
formance of the two mechanisms and to study how human subjects learn and
converge to the Nash equilibrium outcome under diﬀerent settings. Finally
a paper by Gailmard and Palfrey (forthcoming) compare the serial rule with
voluntary cost sharing mechanisms with proportionate rebate and with no
rebates. They consider the case of an excludable binary public good, while
the other studies allow for multiple levels of provision of a private good.
In this paper we focus on the strategic properties of the serial cost sharing
rule, by testing the mechanism under a sequential and a simultaneous-move
treatment. We investigate the performance of the serial rule with four diﬀer-
ent types of agents under limited information (i.e., the human players know
only their own cost share and total payoﬀ, but have no information on their
opponents’ payoﬀ structure). In order to isolate and characterize the indi-
vidual subjects’ strategic behavior, we have designed the experiment so that
each human player interacts with three computerized agents.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the serial cost
sharing rule and reviews its normative properties. Section 3 describes the
experimental design, Section 4 reports the results of the experiment, and
Section 5 concludes.
32 The Serial Cost Sharing Rule
Consider a set of potential users of a shared resource, N = {1,2,···,i,···,n}.
Let qi be the quantity of the common resource that each users wish to con-
sume. Let C(q) be the cost function for producing q units of output. We
assume that C is strictly convex, nondecreasing on  + and C(0) = 0. A cost
sharing mechanism is a mapping ξ associating to each cost function C and
a vector of individual demands q =( q1,···,q n) ∈  n
+ a vector of cost shares
(x1,···,x n) ∈  n
+ such that:






qi)( xi ≥ 0).
The serial cost sharing rule can be described as follows: The individuals
report their individual demands (q1,···,q n). Given such demands, order
them in increasing order: qn ≥ qn−1 ≥ ··· ≥ q1. Then assign to the ﬁrst





That is, agent 1 pays 1/nth of the cost of producing n times the quantity
she demands, nq1, or his unanimity bound.
Agent 2 (i.e., the one with the second lowest demand) is then charged
agents 1’s cost share plus 1/(n − 1)th of the incremental cost from nq1 to





C(q1 +( n − 1)q2) − C(nq1)
n − 1
.
And so on. To write a general formula, it is useful to redeﬁne quantities in the
following way, still assuming without loss of generality, qn ≥ qn−1 ≥ ···≥ q1:
q
1 = nq1,q
2 =( n − 1)q2 + q1,q
3 =( n − 2)q3 + q2 + q1,···,
q













































(n +1− j)(n − j)
∀i =1 ,···,n.
The serial cost sharing rule satisﬁes several normative properties. The
rule is monotonic: that is, the individual cost shares are nondecreasing in qi.
It satisﬁes fair ranking: if qi ≥ qj then xi(C,q) ≥ xj(C,q) .T h er u l es a t i s ﬁes
anonymity: the name of the agents does not matter, and smoothness: the
cost shares are continuously diﬀerentiable functions of the vector of demands.
Each cost share is bounded from above by the unanimity bound
C(nqi)
n ≥
xi(C,q) and from below by the stand alone cost share xi(C,q) ≥ C(qi).
Finally, the rule possesses a strong strategic property. Assuming that each
user derives utility or proﬁtf r o mqi, and assuming that each has a bounded
endowment of resources Mi, then preferences can be deﬁn e do n[ 0 ,M i]× +.
They are nondecreasing in qi,n o n i n c r e a s i n gi nxi, nowhere locally satiated,
continuous, convex and representable by a general utility function Ui(qi,x i).
Notice that special cases, such as a quasi-linear utility function (Ui(qi,x i)=
ui(qi) − xi), are included under this general utility speciﬁcation. Consider
in this context the normal form game where each agent chooses strategically
her output demand and the cost shares are calculated according to the serial
formula described above. Such a game has a unique strong Nash equilibrium
at all preference proﬁles, as Moulin and Shenker (1992) show. The game is
dominance solvable and noncooperative behavior is unambiguously optimal.
3 Experimental Design
To experimentally test the performance and applicability of the serial cost
sharing rule, we have designed an experiment to study the subjects’ behavior
when asked to choose strategically output demand, given that the cost is
allocated according to the serial cost sharing formula. We have considered
the simple case where individual demanders have continuous quasi-linear
preferences of the form Ui = αiqi − xi,w h e r eαi is the marginal willingness
to pay for the shared good, qi is the chosen quantity, and xi the cost share
5they must pay to get the corresponding quantity. We have assumed a convex
cost function of the form C(q)=
q2
2 ,w h e r eq is the total quantity requested
by all agents.
The experimental design is such that each subject is called to share the
good with (or plays against) three computerized players. The subjects are
told that the computerized players always choose the quantity that earns
the highest possible return or maximizes utility. Every player, human or
computerized, is characterized by a diﬀerent preference parameter αi.T h e
higher αi, the more the player likes the good and the higher her optimal
demand should be. With general parameters and assuming α1 < α2 < α3 <





























We conducted the experiment under two diﬀerent treatments. In the ﬁrst
treatment, the serial rule is implemented sequentially. That is, with four
players, the allocation of quantities and cost shares to players is implemented
in four successive rounds, as if the game was played sequentially. This corre-
sponds to the implementation of the mechanism in dominant strategies. In
the ﬁrst round, the cost share assigned to every player i requesting a quantity









where qi is the quantity requested. Each player will, therefore, demand the








Out of the four quantities requested, only the lowest demand will be satisﬁed
and the corresponding payoﬀ (αqi−2q2
i)w i l lb ep a i d .L e tq∗
1 be the quantity
requested and assigned in the ﬁrst round. Observe that q∗
1 is actually the
strategy that guarantees the highest utility level for player 1.
In the second round, we consider the reduced game with three players


















6where qi again is the quantity reported by each player in the second round,
n o ts m a l l e rt h a nq∗
1.1 Given this cost share, each of the three players will





















Out of the three quantities requested, again only the lowest quantity, say q∗
2,
will be assigned, and the corresponding payoﬀ will be paid. This process con-
tinues, until all players have been assigned a quantity and received a payoﬀ.
This algorithm, as Moulin and Shenker observe (1992, page 1019), corre-
sponds to the successive elimination of dominated strategies and the game
induced by the serial rule converges to a unique strong Nash equilibrium.
In this multi-rounds game, every player has a dominant strategy: to truth-
fully compute at each round the solution of the corresponding optimization
problem.
In the second treatment, the experiment is implemented as a normal
form or a simultaneous move game. That is, the four players simultaneously
request quantities, the program orders them and charges to each player the
corresponding cost share. Since three of the players are computerized and
always play their Nash equilibrium strategy, it is feasible to implement the
mechanism as a one shot game, and the choice for the human subject is,
incentive-wise, equivalent to the one that they are called to make when the
game is implemented sequentially.
All experiments have been conducted at the Mississippi Experimental Re-
search Laboratory at the University of Mississippi. Seventy-seven subjects
participated in the experiments. They were students recruited from upper
division and graduate classes in the School of Business. Each student was
recruited to participate in two sessions approximately one week apart. The
ﬁrst session was a training session in which the subjects familiarized them-
selves with the program. Subjects were paid a $10 show-up fee. In both
1In order to preserve the nonmanipulability of the serial cost sharing rule, notice the
speciﬁc constraint on the quantities requested after the ﬁrst round (see Moulin and Shenker
1992, page 1028). That is, in each round after the ﬁrst, the quantities that subjects are
permitted to choose cannot be smaller than the quantity assigned in the previous round.
This constraint is very similar to the practice followed in standard English auctions, where
bidders, once they dropped out of the auction at a lower price are not allowed to reenter
the bidding process at a higher price.
7sessions they were asked to go through 30 periods of experiment. In the sec-
ond session subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee in addition to their earnings
from the experiment. Total earnings ranged from a low of $5 to a high of
$20, the average earnings were $17.85. A copy of the instructions is provided
in the Appendix. The computer screen presented to the subject is shown in
Figure 1. On the screen, subjects can select and change the quantity desired
by clicking on the arrows. For each quantity selected, the screen shows the
potential earnings, cost share and proﬁt.
In each of the 30 periods, the players, both computerized and human,
were assigned a diﬀerent preference parameter value α.W ec o n s i d e r e dt w o
diﬀerent sets of possible values for the αs( s e eT a b l e1 ) . I nt h eF i r s tS e t ,
the 30 values for the α parameter were integer numbers selected from the
interval [0,70], while in the Second Set, the values were selected from the
interval [32,100].2 Under the First Set of α v a l u e s ,a sw ec a ns e ef r o mT a b l e
1, the optimal Nash equilibrium quantities when costs are shared according
to the serial rule are integer numbers from the interval [0,19], while the Nash
equilibrium quantities under the Second Set of α values are integer numbers
in [8,48].3
Given the subjects’ preferences, cost shares were calculated by the com-
puter according to the serial cost sharing rule. Under the ﬁrst treatment, in
each period there were 4 rounds of quantities assignment, while in the second
treatment quantities were assigned simultaneously. Under both treatments,
the subjects had only information about their own earnings, their cost shares
and the resulting proﬁt corresponding to each quantity selected. Once the
subjects made their choice and requested a particular quantity, under the
simultaneous move treatment, they were informed of their ﬁnal proﬁta n d
led to the next period of play. Under the sequential treatment, on the other
hand, after having selected a quantity, the subjects were informed whether
2We added the Second Set of values, once we realized that when using preferences from
the First Set, the application of a diﬀerent cost sharing rule, such as the average cost
sharing rule, would not have lead to the subjects demanding positive quantities. This
problem does not arise when the preferences are selected from the Second Set of Values.
3A t-test shows at the 1%-level of signiﬁcance that the two sets of values are diﬀer-
ent and that the average equilibrium strategy resulting from the First Set of preference
parameters is on average signiﬁcantly lower than the optimal strategy resulting from the
Second Set of preference parameters. The use of these two sets of values for the subjects’
preferences has allowed us to test the sensitivity of the serial cost sharing rule with respect
to subjects demanding small versus large quantities.
8the chosen quantity was the lowest quantity requested, in which case their
ﬁnal proﬁt was also communicated; or whether their quantity was not the
smallest quantity requested, in which case they were led to the next round.
The players were allowed to choose any positive integer quantity, that is,
their strategy space was the set of integer positive numbers. The subjects
knew they were in a game, playing with computerized agents. They were
also told that the computerized agents always behaved in such a way as to
minimize the cost of the requested quantity, or to maximize their proﬁt. A
summary of all the experiments is reported in Table 2.
4 Experimental Results
Results on the aggregate performance of the serial cost sharing rule are re-
ported in Tables 3 through 8.
Table 3 shows, for each of the 30 periods, the optimal Nash equilibrium
strategy, the average, minimum and maximum quantities requested by the
subjects when the serial rule is implemented sequentially, and the preference
parameters are drawn, respectively, from the First Set and the Second Set
of values. Tables 4 provides, for the two sets of preference values with the
serial rule implemented sequentially, the proportion subjects choosing the
Nash equilibrium strategy in each period (with deviations of plus and minus
two units from the optimal quantity).4 Tables 5 and 6 present the same data
for the other treatment, with the serial rule implemented as a simultaneous
move game.
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the major ﬁndings characterizing the experi-
ments, according to 1) the number of times and the percentage of Nash Equi-
librium play5;2 )t h ee ﬃciency from the mechanism, measured as percentage
of potential proﬁt realized; and 3) the percentage of times that the subjects
were assigned quantities in the correct ordering. The tables show this infor-
mation for the two diﬀerent treatments. For example, from the two tables
we can see that out of 30 periods in each experiment, the unique Nash equi-
librium strategy was chosen by a minimum of 38.67% of subjects (sequential
4Given the shape of the proﬁt function, deviations of plus or minus two units from the
optimal quantity have almost no eﬀect on total proﬁt.
5With deviations of plus or minus two units from the optimal quantity.
9treatment, Second Set of Values) to a maximum of 84.38% of subjects (se-
quential treatment, First Set of Values). On average subjects attained from a
minimum 90.34% of the potential proﬁt (simultaneous treatment, Second Set
of Values), to 94.83% of the potential proﬁt (sequential treatment, First Set
of Values). Finally, the correct ordering of quantities provided was preserved
from a minimum of 51% of the periods (sequential treatment, Second Set of
Values), to over 89% of the times (sequential treatment, First Set of Values).
Examining the behavior of subjects during the periods of experiment, we
see that in general their choices did not converge to the dominant strategy
choice immediately. Even though the game induced by the serial cost sharing
rule is dominance solvable and has a unique strong Nash equilibrium, the
players took several iterations of the game to converge to it.
Figures 2 and 3 plot the diﬀerences between the optimal Nash equilibrium
quantity and the quantity actually chosen on average by the subjects in each
period. It is evident that learning occurs in each session since the proportion
of Nash equilibrium play increases over time. Even though subjects often
do not choose the unique Nash equilibrium strategy, their deviations from
the optimal value are not too large, and decrease over time as the subjects
become experienced, as the downward trends in Figure 2 and 3 show.
We can state the following results.
Result 1.A. (Proportion of Nash Equilibrium Play: Comparison
between Treatments.) — The percentage of Nash Equilibrium play is
signiﬁcantly lower under the Sequential Treatment.
Support.Az - t e s tc o n ﬁrms at the 5%-level of signiﬁcance that the pro-
portion of Nash Equilibrium play is higher under the Simultaneous Move
treatment. Over all types of subjects, and all sets of preference parame-
ters, the percentage of Nash equilibrium play under the sequential treatment
is 73.49%, while under the Simultaneous Move treatment it is 76.67% (one
tailed z-test value is 1.76).
Result 1.B. (Proportion of Nash Equilibrium Play: Comparison
between Sets of Values).—Under both treatments, if values are drawn
from the Second Set of Values, the percentage of Nash Equilibrium play is
signiﬁcantly decreased.
Support.U s i n gt h ed a t ap r o v i d e di nT a b l e s7a n d8w ec a ns h o wt h a t
the proportion of Nash Equilibrium play is higher at the 1%-level of signif-
icance when preferences are drawn from the First set of Values under both
10treatments (for the Simultaneous Move treatment the one-tailed z-test value
is 5.81, while for the Sequential treatment the one-tailed z-test value is 15).
Figures 4 and 5 show the percentage of subjects choosing a quantity
“close” to the optimal Nash equilibrium quantity, as a function of the sub-
jects’ optimal value. In Figure 4a and 4b, such percentages are shown for
all possible values of the preference parameter under the two diﬀerent treat-
ments. The higher is the optimal Nash equilibrium quantity that the subjects
should choose, the lower is the percentage of subjects that will choose cor-
rectly, as the downward sloping trend in Figure 4 reveals. Figures 5a, 5b, 5c
and 5d show the same information, for the two diﬀerent sets of preference
parameter values. Under both treatments, the percentage of subjects not
choosing optimally is much higher under the Second Set of Values.
Result 2.A. (Eﬃciency: Comparison between Treatments.) —
There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two treatments in terms of
eﬃciency, measured as percentage of potential proﬁt actually realized.
Support.U s i n gaz - t e s t ,a tt h e1 % - l e v e lo fs i g n i ﬁcance we cannot reject
the hypothesis that for all values the percentages of potential proﬁts realized
under the two treatments are equal. Pulling all the values together, the
percentage of potential proﬁt realized by all subjects under the sequential
treatment is 93.51%, while the percentage realized under the simultaneous
treatment is 90.76% (z-test values is 2.45).
Result 2.B. (Eﬃciency: Comparison between Sets of Values.) —
Eﬃciency, as percentage of potential proﬁt realized, under the Second Set of
Values is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the eﬃciency under the First Set of
Values for the Simultaneous Move treatment (1% level of signiﬁcance) and
for the Sequential treatment (10% level of signiﬁcance).
Support. As indicated by the data shown in Tables 10, for all treatments,
at the 1%-level of signiﬁcance, the percentage of potential proﬁtr e a l i z e di s
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when preferences are drawn from the First Set of
Values (93.74% as compared with 91.19%; one-tailed z-test value is 2.11).
In terms of eﬃciency, under both treatments, on average, subjects were
able to gain more than 90% of the available surplus: 94.83% when the serial
rule is implemented sequentially and 92% when it is implemented as a simul-
taneous move game for the First Set of values. If the preference parameters
are drawn from the Second Set of values, the eﬃciency performance under
the two treatments is reduced.
11Result 3.A. (Correct Order of Quantities: Comparison between
Treatments).—The Simultaneous Move treatment does not perform signif-
icantly better than the Sequential implementation of the serial rule in terms
of Correct Order of quantity, measured as the percentage of times that the
correct order of quantities provided has been preserved in the realized alloca-
tion.
Support. Using a z-test, at the 1%-level of signiﬁcance, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that for all values, the percentage of times the correct order
realizes is equal under the Simultaneous Move treatment when compared to
the Sequential treatment. Pulling all the values together, the percentage of
times the correct order realizes for all subjects under the Sequential treatment
is 80.00%, while the percentage realized under the Simultaneous treatment
is 79.62% (one-tailed z-test value is 0.22).
Result 3.B. (Correct Order of Quantities: Comparison between
Sets of Values).—The Correct Order of Quantity under the Second Set of
Values is signiﬁcantly lower (at the 1%-level of signiﬁcance) than the Correct
Order of Quantities under the First Set of Values for both treatments.
Support. As the data shown in Tables 9 indicates, for all treatments
the percentage of times the correct order of quantities realizes is higher when
preferences are drawn from the First Set of Values (88.78% as compared to
61.20%; one-tailed z-test value is 14.14).
Result 4. Learning.—Both treatments exhibit a signiﬁcant amount
of learning as subjects play over time. Mistakes are signiﬁcantly lower as
subjects become experienced, and under the Simultaneous Move treatment.
Support. We have estimated a linear least squares model using as depen-
dent variable the absolute diﬀerence between the Nash Equilibrium quantity
(q∗) and the actual choice realized by the subjects (qi), according to the
following speciﬁcation:
|q
∗ − qi| = f(q
∗2,Time,Treat,Set).
The independent variable is the square of the Nash Equilibrium quantity
(q∗2), the period in which the subjects are playing (Time), the treatment
group (Treat), which equals 0 for the Simultaneous Move treatment and 1
for the Sequential treatment, and the Set of Values (Set), which is equal to
0 for the First Set of Values and 1 for the Second Set of Values.
12The total number of observations is 2310. Estimates are reported in Ta-
ble 11 below. Accounting for the treatment and Set of Values, the absolute
diﬀerence between the Nash Equilibrium and the quantity chosen is signif-
icantly lower the higher is the period in which subjects are playing. This
represents strong evidence for a learning eﬀect. The signiﬁcant positive co-
eﬃcient on the variable q∗2 supports the conclusion that subjects’ deviation
from the optimal quantity increases the higher the value of this quantity. In
addition, the absolute deviation is — ceteris paribus — slightly higher if the
Sequential treatment is implemented.
These results are consistent with Y. Chen’s (2003) and Chen and Raz-
zolini (2204) results on the incentive properties of the serial rule. Both pa-
pers compare the performance of the serial rule with the average cost pricing
mechanism. Under complete information,6 the two mechanisms converge to
the Nash equilibrium. Under limited information,7 however, the serial rule
performs robustly better in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium
allocation. The present experiment is similar to Chen’s and Chen and Raz-
zolini’s limited information treatment, in the sense that our subject only have
information about their own cost shares and payoﬀs. In the two previous
studies, the subjects maintain their preference parameter throughout the en-
tire experiment, while in our experiment, the subjects’ preference parameter
changes in each period. This implies that in each period the allocation mech-
anism must converge to a diﬀerent Nash equilibrium allocation. In Chen’s
experiment, the subjects play for 150 periods and face only one opponent
player, so that the strategic interaction among players is simpliﬁed. In Chen
and Razzolini’s experiment, there are 50 rounds of play and four types of
players, with the most complicated scenario of possible strategic interactions
among players. In our experiment, subjects face three computerized oppo-
nents, each with a diﬀerent preference parameter. The use of computerized
players allows us to design a controlled environment in which to analyze the
strategic properties of the serial rule independent on additional complica-
tions caused and induced by human interaction. Finally in our experiment,
the subjects play only for 30 periods; that is, at most they get to choose
6Under the complete information treatment, subjects have information about their own
and their opponent’s cost shares and proﬁt for any quantity demanded.
7In this case, subjects have information only about their proﬁta f t e rr e q u e s t i n ga
quantity.
13a quantity for 120 times, if the sequential treatment is applied. Given all
these diﬀerences, however, we conﬁrm that while some learning is needed,
the serial mechanism leads to almost eﬃcient allocations.
5 Conclusions
This paper reports an experimental test of the equilibrium strategic proper-
ties of serial cost sharing rule originally proposed by Shenker (1990) and then
analyzed by Moulin and Shenker (1992). We brought subjects into an exper-
imental laboratory and asked them to make decisions about the quantity of
a common good they desire to acquire, given that costs are shared accord-
ing to the serial cost sharing rule. We report measures of the performance
and eﬃciency of the serial mechanism by comparing the choices and values
attained by the subjects to the expected Nash equilibrium allocations.
We tested the rule using two diﬀerent treatments: a simultaneous move
application versus a sequential implementation of the serial rule. Even though
easier to understand and implement, the simultaneous move treatment’s per-
formance failed to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the sequential implementa-
tion. The latter corresponds to the implementation of the rule in dominant
strategies. We also tested the rule using two diﬀerent sets of preference pa-
rameter values: the higher the optimal quantity that subjects are supposed
to demand, the worse is the performance of the serial rule. This follows from
the fact that the search for the optimal quantity is conducted over a larger
set.
In conclusion, experimental evidence shows that, learning is needed. How-
ever, while some learning is needed, the serial mechanism leads to almost
eﬃcient allocations. There are many examples of dominant strategy mecha-
nisms which do not perform well in the experimental laboratory, in the sense
that subjects fail to play their dominant strategy. The serial mechanism just
conﬁrm this ﬁnding: learning is necessary for the subjects to identify their
dominant strategy.
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33 21 12 25 16 6 3 8 48 72 57 51 12 31 16 13
64 58 62 52 19 15 17 13 99 64 79 73 42 16 22 19
43 20 23 46 16 5 6 19 85 80 70 64 28 23 18 16
1 92 29 0 8 1 13 0 6 1 5 28 55 5 1 71 34 11 4
30 12 15 29 12 3 4 11 59 75 80 56 15 23 28 14
37 24 27 44 12 6 7 19 65 60 84 63 17 15 36 16
12 18 42 38 3 5 19 15 63 76 60 63 16 29 15 16
82 6 4 0 4 3 2 81 5 1 8 3 93 5 3 2 4 5 1 1 981 7
17 8 26 11 6 2 15 3 63 60 95 69 16 15 45 19
47 8 49 35 17 2 19 11 55 52 89 55 14 13 48 14
4 0 2 9 83 7 1 6 921 3 8 07 8 6 0 7 8 2 3 2 1 1 5 2 1
12 18 20 22 3 5 6 8 100 80 72 78 41 21 18 20
41 42 12 39 13 14 3 12 52 74 62 58 13 29 17 15
84 1 1 4 3 8 2 1 9 41 6 4 24 0 3 8 3 2 1 3 1 1 1 0 8
0 30 21 3 0 19 10 1 67 71 64 78 17 19 16 26
3 7 1 5 03 3 1 8 501 4 6 87 2 5 6 7 4 1 8 2 0 1 4 2 2
70 69 67 64 19 18 17 16 99 60 70 66 48 15 19 17
35 33 12 37 11 10 3 13 51 48 80 57 13 12 39 16
30 24 34 32 8 6 11 9 84 63 55 52 39 18 14 13
59 60 44 53 17 18 11 14 73 64 95 79 19 16 38 22
33 29 20 42 10 8 5 19 84 63 77 60 30 16 23 15
16Table 2 — Features of Experimental Sessions
Preference # # Obser- Game Length
Treatment Parameter Subjects vations (periods)
Sequential First Set 32 960 30/4rounds
Sequential Second Set 10 300 30/4rounds
Simult. Move First Set 20 600 30
Simult. Move Second Set 15 450 30
17Table 3 — Sequential Treatment
First Set of Values (32) Second Set of Values (10)
Nash Equil. Avg qt Min qt Max qt Nash Equil. Avg qt Min qt Max qt
Period quantity requested requested requested quantity requested requested requested
1 16 12.9 4 24 33 20.4 10 30
2 18 17 3 18 17 15.8 14 20
3 9 8.2 3 17 28 18.3 15 20
42 2 . 3 14 1 9 1 6 . 6 1 5 2 0
5 4 4.1 1 10 27 17.1 10 20
62 2 . 3 14 2 3 1 7 . 7 1 1 2 0
7 14 12.4 3 15 14 11.8 9 14
8 5 5 2 9 8 7.5 6 10
9 8 7.7 2 12 24 18.8 10 22
10 16 13.6 5 17 12 11.1 10 13
11 19 16.1 0 17 42 21.8 10 25
12 16 14.9 6 22 28 18.8 12 21
13 8 7.8 2 16 17 14.3 12 20
14 12 10.9 2 14 15 15.1 12 20
15 12 11.2 4 15 17 15.7 10 20
16 3 3.3 1 5 16 15.4 10 20
17 2 2.4 1 4 11 9.5 8 11
18 6 6 3 10 16 15.5 10 20
19 17 15.9 5 19 14 12.9 10 15
20 16 14.7 7 18 23 19 15 20
21 3 3.6 3 6 41 23.2 20 30
22 13 12.4 2 15 13 1.7 10 13
23 2 2.1 1 3 13 10.1 9 12
24 0 0.2 0 2 17 17.1 14 21
25 18 16.1 6 19 18 17.3 14 21
26 19 17.4 0 24 48 22.8 20 25
27 11 10.9 5 14 13 11.5 9 13
28 8 8.2 5 13 39 20.3 10 37
29 17 16.7 6 23 19 18.3 13 21
30 10 10 4 14 30 20.2 17 22
18Table 4 — Sequential Treatment, Nash Equilibrium Play
First Set of Values Second Set of Values
Nash % Subjects (32) Nash % Subjects (10)
Equilibrium choosing NE qt Equilibrium choosing NE qt
Period Quantity (+2,-2) Quantity (+2,-2)
1 16 53.1 33 0
2 18 53.1 17 70
3 9 73.1 28 0
4 2 100 19 40
5 4 87.5 27 0
6 2 100 23 0
7 14 78.1 14 50
8 5 90.6 8 100
9 8 87.5 24 10
10 16 68.7 12 100
11 19 59.4 42 0
12 16 78.1 28 0
13 8 78.1 17 30
14 12 84.4 15 60
15 12 81.2 17 40
16 3 100 16 70
17 2 100 11 70
18 6 93.7 16 70
19 17 81.2 14 80
20 16 81.2 23 0
21 3 93.7 41 0
22 13 87.5 13 80
23 2 100 13 20
24 0 100 17 60
25 18 75 18 60
26 19 81.2 48 0
27 11 84.4 13 70
28 8 93.7 39 10
29 17 90.6 19 70
30 10 90.6 30 0
19Table 5 — Simultaneous Move Treatment
First Set of Values (20) Second Set of Values (15)
Nash Equil. Avg qt Min qt Max qt Nash Equil. Avg qt Min qt Max qt
Period quantity requested requested requested quantity requested requested requested
1 16 13.9 3 16 33 23.6 2 33
2 18 15.8 4 18 17 14.9 3 21
3 9 8.3 4 9 28 21.3 4 30
4 2 2.1 0 10 19 16.5 4 20
5 4 3.9 1 5 27 21.2 4 30
6 2 2 0 ?? 23 18.5 5 23
7 14 12.6 3 14 14 12.5 5 14
8 5 4.9 2 10 8 8.8 5 15
9 8 7.4 1 15 24 18.5 3 24
1 0 1 61 3 . 9 41 6 1 2 1 262 0
11 19 16.1 2 19 42 31.5 6 42
12 16 14 0 16 28 22.4 5 30
13 8 7.8 1 15 17 14.7 5 20
14 12 11.3 0 25 15 13.7 6 20
15 12 10.4 1 12 17 15.3 6 20
16 3 3.1 1 5 16 14.9 9 20
17 2 2.2 1 5 11 11.2 7 14
18 6 6.1 4 10 16 13.9 5 20
19 17 15.9 3 17 17 12.8 6 16
20 16 14 1 16 23 19.2 8 23
21 3 3 1 5 41 31.5 9 41
22 13 11.3 3 14 13 12.6 6 17
23 2 2.2 1 5 13 12.3 9 14
24 0 0.3 0 5 17 14.8 5 20
25 18 16.1 4 18 18 16.6 8 20
26 19 16.2 2 19 48 36.4 10 50
27 11 9.9 4 11 13 12.6 8 15
28 8 7.9 5 15 39 29.9 7 40
29 17 14.8 3 17 19 16.9 10 20
30 10 9.5 5 10 30 24.1 8 30
20Table 6 — Simultaneous Move Treatment, % Nash Equilibrium Play
First Set of Values Second Set of Values
Nash % Subjects (20) Nash % Subjects (15)
Equilibrium choosing NE qt Equilibrium choosing NE qt
Period Quantity (+2,-2) Quantity (+2,-2)
1 16 80 33 53.3
21 8 8 0 1 7 6 0
3 9 80 28 60
4 2 85 19 73.3
5 4 95 27 60
6 2 90 23 60
7 14 80 14 73.3
8 5 85 8 73.3
9 8 80 24 60
10 16 80 12 73.3
11 19 80 42 66.7
12 16 80 28 66.7
13 8 85 17 60
14 12 75 15 66.7
15 12 80 17 66.7
16 3 85 16 73.3
17 2 90 11 86.7
18 6 90 16 60
19 17 85 14 80
20 16 80 23 60
21 3 90 41 66.7
22 13 75 13 73.3
23 2 90 13 80
24 0 95 17 53.3
25 18 85 18 80
26 19 80 48 66.7
27 11 80 13 80
28 8 80 39 66.7
29 17 80 19 66.7
30 10 80 30 66.7
21Table 7 - Summary of Results: Sequential Treatment, Both Sets of Values
Proportion Eﬃciency Correct Ordering
of NE from the Preserved
Play Mechanism on Average
Sequential
Treatment 84.38% 94.83% 89.06%
1st Set of Values
Sequential
Treatment 38.67% 92.48% 51%
2nd Set of Values
Table 8 - Summary of Results: Simultaneous Move Treatment, Both Sets of Values
Proportion Eﬃciency Correct Ordering
of NE from the Preserved
Play Mechanism on Average
Simult. Move
Treatment 83.33% 92% 88.33%
1st Set of Values
Simult. Move
Treatment 67.78% 90.34% 68%
2nd Set of Values
22Table 9 - Summary of Results: Sequential and Simultaneous Move Treatments, all Values
Proportion Eﬃciency Correct Ordering
of NE from the Preserved
Play Mechanism on Average
Simult. Move
Treatment 76.67% 90.76% 79.62%
1st & 2nd Set of Values
Sequential
Treatment 73.49% 93.53% 80.00%
1st & 2nd Set of Values
Table 10 - Summary of Results: First and Second Sets of Values, all Treatments
Proportion Eﬃciency Correct Ordering
of NE from the Preserved
Play Mechanism on Average
Simult. Move & Sequent.
Treatment 83.97% 93.74% 88.78%
1st Set of Values
Simult. Move & Sequent.
Treatment 56.13% 91.19% 61.20%
2nd Set of Values
23Table 11 - Estimates of linear least squares models (Newey-West
HAC standard errors and covariance estimators); dependent variable is
t h ea b s o l u t ed i ﬀerence between the Nash Equilibrium quantity and the
quantity chosen (n = 2310)
123
C 0.793732 * 0.39770 0.315444
(0.408489) (0.460892) (0.443853)
q∗2 0.007967 *** 0.008061 *** 0.007865 ***
(0.000830) (0.000799) (0.000803)
Time -0.036454 * -0.036758 * -0.036122 *
(0.020966) (0.020888) (0.020649)




Adj. R2 0.352180 0.356131 0.356426
F-Statistic 628.6307 426.7108 320.6946
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at the
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels respectively.
24